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.food·Drug·Cosmetic law
~--FREDERICK M. HART Discusses

rfhe Postal Fraud Statutes:
Th-eir lJ se and Abuse
Mr. Hart Warns That Authority for Issuance of a Fraud Order
Should Be Made to Stand Rigid Tests as to Constitutionality

rr

HE PO\YER TO EST.-\BLISH a postal system is specifically
grantcrl tn Congress hy the Constituti"n of the l'nited State:,. 1
This power has been held tu embrace the regulation ui the entire
pustal system~ and led. in 1872. to one of the earliest statntl',; aimed at
fraudulent merchandising. 3 In that year Congress vested in the Post
Office Department the power to refuse mail service to anyone whr, is
"conducting any . . . scheme or device for obtaining money or property of any kind through the mails by false or fraurlulent pretenses,
representations, or prnmises" and tu return all mail sent such per,;ons
to the addressee. "with the word 'Fraurlulent' plainly written nr ,-t;un1xd
upon the outsi(k thereof . . . . ·• 4 As an added sanction, the Postmaster
General may also decree that money orrlers made out in favor r.f these
operators be refused payment. 5 In 1889 the fraudulent use of the mails
was marle a criminal offense as well. 6
I United
States Constitution, Art. I,
Sec. 8.
'Public Cleariny House l'. Coyne, 194
U. S. -197 <1904).
••17 Stat. 322 (1872>. as amended. 3!J
use SPc. 259 <1952l: n Stat. 323 0872).
.;s .tmended. 39 use Sec. 732 09521.

'17 Stat.

322

0872).

use Ser. 259 (19521.
'' 17 Stat. 323 (1872),
use Sec. 732 11952).

as umen,ied.

3!)

as amtended.

39

18 USC Sec. 1341 (originall;· enacted on
March 2. 1889, Ch. 393. Sec. 1. 25 Stat.
873) .
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The history of the enforcement of these federal statutes reveals
that the courts have not always been in sympathy with their censorlike provisions. Their constitutionality has been upheld, however.
against attacks challenging that they (1) are an undue limitation upon
freedom of speech in violation of the First Amendment :7 (2) contain
unlawful search and seizure provisions in violation of the Fourth
Amendment; (3) do not comply with the due-process clause of the
Fifth Amendment; and (4) inflict unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. 8
Notwithstanding the courts' refusal to invalidate the statutes on
constitu.tional grounds, they have indicated a tendency to restrict the
Post Office Department's use of them to cases in which there can be
little doubt of their applicability. 9 This is unquestionably due not only
to a reluctance on their part to sanction any "prior restraint" statutes,
but also because of the potential power which such laws place in the
hands of the Postmaster General. 10 Not only is the one. proceeded
against barred from receiving any and all mail, but-further than that
-his customers, suppliers, creditors and, in fact, all his correspondents
are informed by the government that he is engaged in fraudulent
activity. It should be noted here that such fraud orders apply to all
mail sent to the cited party, whether or not it pertains to his fraudulent
operations. There need be no attempt on the part of the Post Office
Department to segregate personal mail from business mail or to refuse
' Public Clearing House v. Coyne, cited
at footnote 2; Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., 333 U. S, 178 (1948); cf. Holmes,
J., dissenting in Leach v. Carlile, 258 U. S.
138, 140 (1922).

• Public Clearing HoUlle v. Coyne, cited
at footnote 2: Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc., cited at footnote 7.
• Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U. S. 269 (1949).
1
° Case cited at footnote 9. at p. 277.

PAGE247

POSTAL F~ACD STATUTES: USE AND ABl'SE

delivery of only that mail connected with the fraud. 11 In effect this
could mean that where a curporati(lll manufactures a line of product:;,
although nnly one of them is met with official objection. its entire lmsiness could he effectively squashed by such an order.
Since the remedies are dangerously powerful, their use must be
restricted to those abuses which they were designe<l to correct. They
are. by their ,·ery wor<ling. aimed at fraud. They are not concerned with
the manufacturer who is engaged in mere "puffing"' of his product
nor e,·en "·ith the advertiser whnse daims border on the misleading.
Before a fraud order can issue, there must be a finding that the accused
party i11tc11tio11ally misrepresented his wares: the respondent must be
k110,,..'i11gly attempting tn <leceiYe the public. 12 \,\ihen the statutes are
so re:;tricted 111 use. the remedies are not so harsh, but arc, indeed,
necessary.
The statute is particularly effectiYe in controlling the drug or
c\eyice distributor ,yho solicits mail-order purchases based upon fraudulent misrepresentations. Such a form of retailing is especially attractive, as distance from the consumer provides easy escape from the
Yictim's available civil remedies. as well as from his extralegal recourse
to local better-business bureaus and to methods devised at bringing
the scorn of the community against a local unprincipled vendor. Here,
huweHr. the source of orders depends upon the delivery of mail. The
charlatan or unprincipled pun·eyor nf useless remedies is usually
without benefit of any normal retail outlets, as the local pharmacy
and general retail establishments will refuse to carry his products.
There is no more efficient method of stopping his business than by stopping his mail.
The enforcement of this law is of special interest to the proprietary
drug manufacturer. These fly-by-night vendors of nostrums are his
competitors, and competitors of the worst sort if they are allowed to
escape punishment for false claims. The drug distributor who can
claim a cancer cure. even if only in the more sensational magazines.
is dangerous not only to the consumer, but also to the legitimate drug
industry ''"hich must truthfully label its products and restrict its
advertising to claims based upon fact.
A~ competitors, they are also a source of discredit to the industry
as a \\"hole. There is nothing which serves to discredit the drug manu11 Public Clearing House v. Coyne, cited
11t footnote 2.

"F"rley v.

Heininger, 105 F.

(2d) 79

(CCA D. C .. 1939). cert. den., 308 U. S.
587 (1939).
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facturers more than these perniciuus peddlers of potential death, and
nothing can make the public less willing tu believe truthful claims of
cures and relief than the expose of the falsity of claims made l>y these
people. To a large degree the proprietary drug industry's' good will is
based upon confidence in the truth of advertising claims. A breach
of that confidence by one swindler weakens the good will uf all.
On the other side, the drug industry must guard against overzealous public officials who would be willing to expand the use of the
postal fraud statutes far beyond that intended by Congress. The legitimate drug house should have little fear front the postal authorities.
as the statutes are not directed at it, but in at least one recent case
there is a vivid showing of a ·reach for pO\-ver by the agency.1'
Largely unnoticed, there have been, during the past few years,
several very significant developments in the enforcement of these
statutes-developments of which the industry should be a,vare. There
is presently a bill before Congress 14 which, if passed without amendment. would vest even greater po,,·crs in the Postmaster General,
nowers which might well be feared not only by illicit operators. but
by the legitimate drug industry and by ail .who are interested in procedural due process. It is the purpose of this article to explore this
legislation, as well as significant recent case de,·elopments .
.Post Office Administrative Procedure

Prior to 1951.-Prior to July of 1951, the issuance of a postal fraud
order involved comparatively simple administrative preceedings. Tt
was possible for the agency to obtain, quickly and effectively, a final
fraud order and enforcement, since it was accomplished merely by the
agency's withholding of the respondent's mail, thus providing no
problems.
The procedure 15 followed by the agency consisted of the issuance
of a complaint by the chief of the frauds section, which was approved
by the solicitor, who then set a time for hearing ~nd served the complaint plus a notice of hearing on the respondent. The respondent
then had an opportunity to answer the complaint and was afforded
a formal hearing before a trial examiner who was a member of the
agency. At the close of the hearing the trial examiner prepared find" Atlanta Corporation v. Olesen, 124 F.
Supp. 482 (DC Calif., 1954).
"H. R. 174. 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
15 Rules of practice In postal fraud proceedings prior to July 8. 1951, are found In

39 CFR Sec. 151.1-39 (1949). ·These were
rescinded by new regulations promulgated
on July 8, 1951. In 16 Federal Register 6683
(1951).
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ing-,.; <>i fact and fonvanle<l them, together "·ith his recommendations.
tu the l'o:-tmaster General for final decision. If the Postmastn Cl'neral
decided that an nrder should issue, he notified the re:-J>"ndent and
notified the local postmaster, who immediately stopped delivery and
began return of all mail addressed to the respondent marked, as directed. with the word "fraudulent." The simplicity of the hearings and
the ea,,;c of enforcement added greatly to the force of the statutes.
?\o effort was made to comply with the provisions of the Admini,,;trative Procedure :\ct. 1 ,; \\'hethcr the postal department was to be
governed by this act in the administration of fraud orders was first
raised in Bcrso.ff c'. Donaldson in 1948.'7 There. the l.;nited States Cumt
uf .-\ppeals for the District uf Columuia held that:
. . . provisions of the Act do not apply to mail fraud orders as Section :i. 5
F. S. C. A, § 1004, thereof confines the prescribed procedure to cases c,i adjudication "required hy statute to be determine,! on the record after opportunity fo1·
an agency hearing." 1 ·'

The statutes
quire a hearing.

19

instituting postal fraud orders do not specifically re-

\Vong Yang Sung v. McGrath and Its Application to Postal Fraud
Proceedings.-ln 1950 the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of Wong Yang Sung 1,. ,WcGrath, 20 in which it was held that deportation hearings. although their authorizing statute did not specifically
require a hearing, were controlled by the Administrative J'n,ccdure
.-\et. The court stated that:
. . . the limiting words [do not] render the Administrative Procedure Act
inapplicable to hearing, the requirement for "·hich has been read into a statute
by the Court in order to save the statute from invalidity."

-Jn 1951 the question of wheth~r the Administrative Procedure Act
\\'as made applicable to postal fraud hearings by this case "·as raised
. hv the petitioner in Cates ,:. Hadcrlein. 2 i The United States Court of
.-\ppeals for the :iennth Circuit. following the Bersoff case/" held that
the ..\dministrative Procedure Act did not control. Certiorari was requested. Before the Supreme Court could act, however, the Post
Office Department had promulgated new regulations which incorporated
''' GO Stat. 237. 5 USC Sec. 1001 (1952).
" 174 F. t2d l 494 (CA D. C .. 1949).
"Bersoff t:. Donaldson, cited at footnote
17. ut p. 495 (italics supplied by the court).
"17 Stat. 322 (1872). as amended. 39
use Sec. 259 (1952); 17 Stat. 323 (1872), as
nmendert. 39 USC Sec. 732 (1952J.
"339 U. S. 33 (1949).

" At p. 50.
There would seem to be
little doubt but that a hearing ls required
to save the postal fraud order statutes
from constitutional Invalidity as a denial
of due process guaranteed by the Fl fth
Amendment.
22 189
F. (2d) 369 (CA-7), rev'd, 342
u. s. 804 (1951).
'" Cited at footnote 17;
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all the guarantees of the Administrative Procedure Act into its fraud
proceedings. 24 · vVhen the case came before the Court, the Post Office
Department took the unusual step of confessing error. and the court,
reversed "upon consideration of respondent's confession of error and
the record." 25 This action of the Supreme Court was interpreted by
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia as being contra to
Bersoff v. Donaldson, 26 and at least one commentator concluded that the
Administrative Procedure Act was now applicable to postal fraud
hearings. 27
Present Hearing Procedure.-The regulations 28 which the Po;;t
Office Department enacted in order to bring its fraud order proceedings
within the Administrative Procedure Act substantially lengthened the
time that it takes the Postmaster General to secure such an order.
Under present regulations, the hearing examiner (who now fulfills the
requirements of Section 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act 29 )
must, at the close of all testimony, allow the parties to submit proposed
findings and conclusions prior to preparing his initial order. Then.
once he makes his findings and his initial decision, he must submit
them to the parties before he presents them to the Postmaster General.
The respondents must be given time to file exceptions to his initial
dec_ision, and these exceptions are presented to the Postmaster Genera I
who must dispose of them prior to issuing a final agency order.
It has also been contended by the agency that additional delays
are occasioned by the deposition provisions of the new regulations. 30
It has been estimated by former Po;,;tmaster General Donaldson that
the disposition of cases takes twice as long under the present rules as
in the past. · It is the position of the agency that this delay is responsible
for a weakening of the fraud statutes. 81

Interim
regulations
as it found
the breach,
order, they

Stop Orders.-The delay caused by adherence. to the new
soon began to cause the Post Office Department concern
the effectiveness of its orders greatly diminished. To fill
occurring between the time of the complaint and the final
appealed to Congress. 82 From all their actions and from

2• 39 CFR Sec. 150.400-426 (1949);
now
found at 39 CFR Sec. 201.1-26.
"'Cates v. Haaerlein, 342 U. S. 804
(1951).
26 Cited at footnote 17.
27 See Note. 94 L. Ed. 631. 652.
,. 39 CFR Sec. 201.1-.27.
•• 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 USC Sec. 1011
(1952). which requires that hearing e,:aminers be primarily controlled by the

Civil Service Commission in regard to
promotions. etc.
'" 39 CFR Sec. 201.19.
31 H.
Rept. 1874, 82d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1952); H. Rept. 850, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1953).
.
12
H. R. 174. 84th Cong .. 1st Sess. (1955)
H. Rept. 850, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953)
H. R. 569, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1953)
H. Rept. 1874, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952)
H. R. 5850. 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
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their public statements before Congress, 33 it would appear that they
accepted the fact that the Administrative Procedure Act applied to
fraud orders and that a formal hearing, in accordance with that act .
was required before the issuance of any type of an order stopping mail
delivery 34 under the law as it is presently written.
In _spite of this, the Post Office Department has pursued a policy
of issuing, without any type of hearing whatsoever, interim impounding orders which result in a refusal by the local postmaster to deliver
any mail to the respondent until the outcome of the agency hearing on
a final order. The mail is not returned to the sender, but is held at the
local post office.
The three United States district courts which have directly ruled
on whether such interim orders are valid have expressly refused to
grant injunctions against their enforcement. 35 These courts have
implied the necessary power for the issuance of such orders from the
general broad duty which has heen reposed in the Postmaster General
-the power to regulate the mails. They have failed to mention (·ither
due process or the applicability of the Administrative Proce<lure Act
to such ordcrc:. The unly restriction which these cnurts have placed
upon such intermediate orders is that they can remain in effect only so
lung as the T'ustmastcr General expeditiously handles the hearings.'";
:\ sharp dissent from the ahove cases occurs in the dictum of a
similar case \\·hich eventually reache<l the hands of Justice Douglas of
the Supreme Court sitting, in chambers. as circuit justice. Procedural
grounds caused him to refuse an injunction against the enforcement
of just such an order in the case of Stanard v. Olesen. 37 Showing a
reluctance to disturb the normal channels of appeal. he accepted a
promise that the Postmaster General would soon decide upon the final
order. and the argument that such decision would render the question
moot-whetheF it be for or against the respondent. He reasoned that
if the order did not issue. the mail would soon be returned, an<l. that if
the final order did issue against the respondent, it could he tested along
with the interim order in one proceeding. Justice Douglas left no
doubt about his belief as to how the case should be decided:
"" Postmaster General Summerfield: H.
Rept. 850, 83d Cong.. 1st Sess. (1953):
Former Postmaster General Donaldson:
H. Rept. 1874. 82d Cong .. 2d Sess. (1952).
'" See Postal Decision 328 (Post Ofllee
Department).

:15 Williams v. Petty, 136 F. Supp. 283
(DC Okla., 1954); Bare! v. 1',islce, 136 F.
Supp. 751 (DC N. Y .. 1954); Wallare v.
Fa.nnin!l, No. 15499-T (unreported) (DC
Calif.).

'" Donnell Manufacturing Company v.
Wyman, 156 F. 415 (CC E. D. Mo .. 1907).
37

74 S. Ct. 768 (1954).
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Cndn the la\\. . . . every business . . . has the right to be let alone.
The Acl111i11istrati\·e Procedure Act . . . gives some protection to that ri~ht.
The power uf the Post Oftice J)epartlllcnt tu restrain the illegal use oi the maib
is subject to that Act . . . .
The power tu impouml at the commencement of the aclministrati\·e proceedings is not expressly delegated to the Post Office . . . . It has such seriou,
possibilities oi abuse (unless carciully restricted) that [ am reluctant to read it
into the statute. I, therefore, strongly incline to the view that the i11te1·im order
is invalid."'

After the Post Office Department had issueJ a final order against
the respondent. this case came before the_ l,'.nited States Court oi
.--\ppeals ior the Xinth Circuit an<l, although the question uf \\·hether
the Postmaster General has the cliscussed power was not squarely in
issue. the court, in dictum, exprcssecl the Yiew that the .-\dministratin'
Procedure Act applied to postal fraud proceedings."v
The Yie\\· of Justice Douglas seems to be by far the one more
consistent with the traditional notions nf fair play and statutory construction. l "nless pruper procedural safeguards are affordecl the
charged party, postal fraud statutes face grave constitutional difficulti·~s
as being violative of the due-process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
T'rupcr procedures are secured by the present administrative regulations p;uverning- the issuance of a final order. They must also be provided before the issuance of an interim order. Since such an nrder i,;
issued ,·.r part,· under present policy, the only argument which the
department can present in the favor of its ·bridging- the due-procesc;
requirements is that the indiYidual may go tu a district court and seek
his re,·iew in the form of an injunctive suit restraining enforcement uf
the order. No other opportunity is afforded whereby he might defend
his rights. Even this tenuous avenue of due process (which fails to
consider the possibility that the Administrative Proce<lure Act applies)
was closed to the petitioner in the aforementioned Staliard case when
the district court held that the petitioner's administrative remedies
were not exhausted and would not be until there was an administrative
decision on the final order.
As has .been indicated. the effect of a fraud order is drastic. This
is no less true of an interim order which may run for months, or eyen
years. than it is for a final order. Because it results in such a violent
taking. the authority for its issuance should be clear and that authority
should be made to stand the rigid tests of constitutionality. Under
"At p. 771.

., Olesen v.

(CA-9, 1955).

Stanard,

227 F.

(2d)

785
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the present la,\' there is nu clear directi<,H tc, the T'nstrnastcr General
\\·hirh can be fairly construed to giYe him the power to issue interim
urcier.,; in the iace nf the abcl\'e objections. The Congre,;s mu,;t act ii
he is to ha,·e such po,,·er.

Pro{'nscd Lcqislation.-The propusecl legislatiun. 1" 1vhich is pe1Hlin,~·
I ,dnre the House of kepresentatives. provides that:
. . . upon the institution of proceedings before the Postmaster General against
any person . . . ior the purpose oi determining whether . . . la postal iraud
urdcr J should he issued, ancl \\'hen it shall appear- to the Postmaster General to he rt'a,<1nably m,cessary iur the protection of the public or to he in the
public interest, he may order that mail addressed tu such person
. . lw
inq,.,unded and detained hy the postmaster at th,· office of dcli1 ery pend ins
tinal dC'ci,ion of the issue, invoh-c<l in said procce<ling, . . .

The legi,;\ation abu specifically allows the respunclent to seek a:1
injuncti<>n against the enforcement uf such an order "upon a showing
that such nrder was issued arbitrarily. L'.apriciously. or imprO\-i(kntly.
and that such onler is not m:cessary for tht' prokdion of the public. .. :·
Thi,; leg'islati()n. in it,; present f .. rm. \\'<>Uld allow the !'<1:,tm:1,.;tcr
General t11 make an ex f'artc determination of whether such an order
:-huuld i,;sue al!d lean' it tn the atfected party to bring the controversy
l,efore the courts. It would force the lntrclen of pro"i nn the respond,·nt
t,, shn11· that the urder was issued ·'arbitrarily. capriciously. or i111pr<l\·ick11tly. and that such order i,; not necessary fur the protection of the
puldic." ( I talirs ,.;upplied. J lt \\'<>Uld seem that it is more in the traditiuns ()four kgal sy,;tem and more in the interest "f fair play t<l make
th..: g<>Yernmenr pn,rced in the court,.; and to shuulder the burden ()f
proof \\'hen ,;uch sanctinns a,; these. albeit they are not technically
punishment,.;. are being imp,.1sed."
l'rol,ahly the most important nhjectiun to this legislation is that it
prm-iJes Jlf> limit ,m the length oft ime which such a "temporary'' order
may remaill in effect. This is extremely important. a_s the length of
the hearings under the fraud statutes has been significantly extended.
Indeed. in ()nc ca,;c recently reported, the entire proceeding consumed
fnur years and four months. 42
l.'mler the presently pn,pu,;ed legislation, the l '()stmaster Ceneral
could have refused delivery during this entire period by a valid interim
-----------------· -----·-------------

'" H. R. 174. 8-lth Cong .. 1st Sess. (19551.
O These statutes
have as their obJective
· the prevention of injury to the public b,·
denying the use of thP malls to those
en;:aged in fraudulent op,•rations. They
are

nut

intended

as

a

punishment

of

wrongdoers.
ii1h'.,

(Donald.son

l'.

Read l'llaga-

,·ited at. Footnote 7: e,nn111i:-:sioncr of

lntemul Revenue ·v.

n9109.

320

u. s.

He,nin.<1er, 44-1 usrc

467 0943).l

"Atlanta Cotporation v. Olesen, cited at

footnote 13.
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order. Such action would undoubtedly destroy the respondent's business long before the conclusion of a final order hearing, and would ·
make such a hearing a farce indeed.

Need for Interim Stop Orders.-That some interim sanctions are
necessary would seem to be evident if the power of the Post Office
fraud orders are to be retained and yet the safeguards of the Administrative Procedure Act are to be incorporated into the regulations for
hearings on the final orders. \Vhere the fraud involves the peddling
of a nostrum, speed is essential to protect not only the pocketbook of
the consumer, but even his health and life. A survey of the advertisements of some of the mail-order drug and device distributors shows
enough promises of "cures" to startle not only the medical man, but
also the casual reader. A closer investigation of these ads often leads
to the conclusion that the loss of time pursuing the useless remedy
could result in additional damage to the ailing victim. Although it is
true that other governmental agencies have concurrent jurisdiction
over false advertising, 43 still-as has been pointed out abO\·e-the mail
fraud statutes have certain advantages when applied to the mail-order
distributor. This is true only as long as quick, effectiYe sanctions
are available.
The presently proposed bill is not the answer, however. Although
it amply provides the rapid administration to be desired, it fails to
protect the respondent from arbitrary actions on the part of the government. \Vhat safeguards it does contain are insignificant and the
legal philosophy of the bill is contrary to our established maxims
of justice.
Alternate, and Better, Method of Accomplishing Same End.-Congress has adopted an alternate method to accomplish the same obje<:tive in regard to the Federal Trade Commission.'' This agency has
practically the identical problem in relation to its "cease and desist"
orders where the agency proceeds against false and misleading advertising. Here, as in the Postal Department hearings, the administrative
process is lengthy, and the delay can often result in a frustration of the
purposes of the Commission. The procedure which Congress deemed
the most advisable for filling the gap between the discovery of the
wrong and the issuance of a final cease-and-desist order was in the
nature of an injunction pendente litr. The law reads, in part:
43 Namely,
the Federal Trade Commission as. to some extent. the Food and
Drug Administration.
See discussion,
below, under "Concurrent Jurisdiction of

Federal Trade Commission and Food and
Drug Administration."
•• 52 Stat. 114 (1938), 15 USC Sec. 53
(1952).
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\Vhe11n·~r tile l_.011rn1i,,inu !ta, rc>a,;uu tn hclieve-( 1) ti1al any pcr,vn . . . is engaged in ,·,r is ahnut to eng-agc in .
an;
. viulation . . . l ni the a,t] aud,
(2) that the enjoining thereof pen<ling the issuance of a rnmplaint hy th,·
Cr)lllllli,,ion . . . an,! until such c•Jmplaiut is <lismissed lH· the Conm,i,si<.>11
, ,r ,et a,ide h,· th<" euurt on review . . . would be to the iut~rest oi the puhli,:,
the Commissinn .
rn:iy bring suit in a district court . , . to cnjnin the
. [ ,·i .. ]ation ].

This would appear t,_, be sume\,·hat less effectiYe than the prncedure rec,:immended under the proposed biU. but the lnss of effectiYeness i:; more than cnmpensated for hy the safeguards which this typ.:
nf interim nrder pruceeding prnYides. lt is worthy .,f note, however,
that thi,.: method .,f securing interim re;.;triction of the respondent\,
mail is only workable as long as the courts refuse to go into the rnerib
of the propnsed fraud order atlfl confine their investigations merely t···
a consideration of whether the Postmaster General has reasonable
yrounds to suspect that the situation requires the issuance ,,i thl' order.,..
.\ further safeguard ,d,ich should be seriously con,;idt·rcd wnulci
be in the nature of a limitati,111 upon the length of time such an injunction can remain in effect. It wnuld seem desirable to limit the in.iunctinn tn a period no longer than is generally required for the hearin;:,:·
process. If the hearings and the <lecision nf the Postmaster General.
either u11aYoidably (1r through the dilatory tactics nf the respondent,
reqmre more time than is expecteci. an extension shuuld he made
a,·ailah\e.

What Constitutes Fraud?
In order for a plaintiff to sustain a common la\\· civil action based
upon fraud he must pnwe that the defendant. knmdngly and with the
purpose of deceiving, made a fabe representation, and that he, the
plaintiff. relied upon that misrepresentation and that he consequently was
damaged.4'' Basically, the same type of allegations and proof must be
made by the Postmaster General to support a fraud order; however,
since here the government is bringing the suit. the courts ha\·e held
that there need be no showing of either actual reliance or of damage.
''' The correct ,·ie\\· of this type of injunctive proceeding is found in F'TC v.
1950-1951 CCH
Trade
Cases
~ 62.894, 191 F.
(2d) 744 (CA-7. 1951).
wht>rein it is stated that the court should
grant the injunction if a showing be made
of "a justifiable basis for believing. derived from reasonable inquiry or other
credible information, that such a state of
affairs . . . existed as reasonably would

Rhodes,

lead the Commission to believe that the
defendants were engaged in .
. violation
of the Act."
"'Although the courts have consistentlv
refused to define "fraud·· on the rational';,
that once it is defined the schemer will
devise a method of circumventing it. these
are generally considered to be the essential elements ( F'arrar v. Churchill, 13;;
lJ. s. 609 (1890)).
.
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Tn Baker ,•. U. S ..," 1 which admittedly arose under the criminal
fraud prn,·isions
the court said :

48

but 1Yhich should rule in fraud order cases as well,

\,\/e do not wish to be understood as intimating that in order to constitute
the offenses it must be sho,\'n that the letters . . . were of a nature calculated
to be effective . . . . 1t is enough if, having devised a scheme to defraud, the
defendant, with a view of executing it deposits in the Post Office letters, which
he thinks may assist in carrying it into effect, although in the judg111cnl of ihe
jury they may be absolutely inrffcctive therefor. [Italics supplied.]

In another criminal action, Deaver v. U. S.,4 9 the court held that
conviction was proper, reg;irdless of actual injury, if the scheme "·as
designed to defraud.
The proof of fraud 111 fact, sans the above t,vo requirements, 1s
necessary for all stop orders. This fraud includes the common law
elements of intent and knowledge, and intent has proved one of the
principal limiting factors in any attempt that the department has
made to expand the use of the statutes. Over 50 years ago, the
Supreme Court dealt a severe blow to its enforcement when it decided,
in the M cAnnulty case, 50 that the Postmaster General could not conclude fraud when there :was a split of medical opinion over whether
the treatment advertised was efficacious. The decision would probably
not have been particularly offensive except for the facts of the case,
which involved a mental cure for illness. This decision has been much
modified by later court rulings, but still stands as a warning that
intent must be shown and that it cannot be shown unless medical and
scientific testimony is practically unanimously in favor of the government's position. The Court, in its latest interpretation of t~is
doctrine, said:
We do not understand or accept it as prescribing an inexorable rule that
automatically bars reliance of the fact-finding tribunal upon informed medical
judgment every time medical witnesses can be produced who blindly adhere
to a curative. technique thoroughly discredited by reliable scientific experiences.
But we do accept the McAnnulty decision as a wholesome limitation upon finding
of fraud under the mail statutes when the charges concern medical practices in
fields where knowledge has not yet crystallized in the crucible of experience."

The statute provides that the Postmaster General is the judge of
what constitutes fraud. The limits of his discretion are narrowed by
the above cases and also by the power that the courts have to review
"115 F. (2d) 533 (CCA-8, 1940), cert.
den., 312 U. S. 692 (1941).
•• 18 use Sec. 1341 (originally enacted
on March 2, 1889, Ch. 393, Sec. 1, 25 Stat.
873).

•, Ui5 F. (2d) 740 (CCA D. C., 1946).
'° American School of Magnetic Healing
v. McAnnultY, 187 U. S. 94 (1902).
·
1
•
Reilly v. Pinkus, cited at footnote 9,
at i:,. 274.
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his actions. Although he is given the power, it could hardly be suggested-even by the department itself--that he has heen given carte
blanche authority; the scope of review which the courts have in these
cases greatly determines how much it is restricted .
.Scope of Review

Speaking of its own powers of review, the District Court for the
District of Columhia said (quoting from Read Magazine v. Hannegan):
The <luty of administering the law dt',·nlves on (the Post111astn t_icncral l
The <liscretion is vested in him. The determination nf the fact whl'tlwr a fraudulent scheme is being cond11ctNl must he mad .. hy him ''upon eviclcncc satisiactnry ·
to him." The court may nnt substitute its u\\'n juclgnwnt for that "i tilt' Pnst·
master General. Neither may it revie,, the weight of cvidcn~" an<l set asi<l<'
his action merely because the court might ha\'C' arriver! at a <liffcn·nt rl'<nlt 01,
the same evidence."

The court here recognizes that Congress has remover! the weighing of evidence from its hands and that, although it is a rourt of first
instance sitting as an equity court. it has but appellate power. Whether
all district courts accept this vie"· is questionable. Recently, the
l~nite<l States District Court for the Southern District of New York.
in a case where it appears a de nova review was granted. stated:
Thr issue. therefore, is not wlwther the claim,
ma, haw hccn l'xag·
in'rated or eveu \\'hether they arr incorrect and misli-.acling. The isst11' is whrtlH·1
they are "iraml11lent" in fact. . . . We arc not t" set 011rselves up as ceu~r,r,
ni the advertising . .
" [Italics supplied.]

Tf the court here meant by ·we they themselves, then it would
appear that they were of the belief that the final decision. the final
weighing of the evidence, was to be <lone hy them.
The better rule would seem to be that the district rourt is to act
merely to determine if there is substantial evidence, in the record as
a whole. to substantiate the Postmaster Genera l's decision. This is
the now-established test being applied by the r11urt:, to administrative
agencies, and it would appear to be the correct test lwre."
It would also seem that the district court should not sit d,· 1w1·,1,
hut should restrict itself to the record as prepared by the Post Offi<'e
Department:
Its jurisdiction is limited to a review of the proreecling, lit'f()rt' th" p.,,,
master General to cietcrmine whether the evidence before '11111 su.,t a ins his ordrr

-------------------·----,;, Ph1h-11.s v. Reill.I/, 71 F Supp. 993
.-., Universal
Uamera
.

( 1946).
"" United States Nature Produl'IR Unr710r,,tion v. Kcha[fer, 125 F. Supp 374 DC'

N. Y .. 1954).

NL,RB, 19 LABOR CASES
474 (1951 ).

~

Corporation
66.191. 3-10 I'

v.

S.
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It ma\' not on an indeprndrnt investigation substitute its judgment for that oi
11,e P(.>stmaster Gen~ral."

Concurrent Jurisdiction of Federal Trade Commission
and Food and Drug Administration
Federal Trade Commissioll.--The postal fraud order provisions are
not the <;ole means which Congress has taken to control fraudulent use
of the mails in connection "·ith the sale of drugs and devices. Perhaps
the principal agency involved in suppressing fraudulent merchandising
not only of drugs, but of all commodities, is the Federal Trade Commission. Although the scope of that agency's policing is far wider than
that of either the Post Office Department or the Food and Drug
Administration, there is specific reference in the act which authorizes
their existence to the use of the mails for the fraudulent advertising
of drugs and devices. Section 12(a) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act ,,n reads:
It shall he unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation to disseminate ... ,. cause tu be disseminated, any false advertisement( I) Hy l:nited States mails, or in commerce by any means, for the purpose
oi induciug, or which is likely to induce, directly or indirectly the purchase of
iood, drugs, devices or cosmetics; ,,r
(2) Hy an) means, for the purpose of inducing, or which is likely to induce,
directly or inclirectly, the purchase in commerce of food, drugs, devices, or
c.osmetics.••

Section 12 (b) of the act establishes that any violation of the quoted
section is an unfair or deceptive act which is condemned by Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
The burden of prnof which FTC has to sustain in an action brought
under S1·ction 5 is much less than that which encumbers the Postmaster
General. 11 must prove merely that the advertising is false, not that it
is fraudulent.''' Tn spite of this. the agency is often criticized fnr the
ineffectiveness <,f its proceedings and its lack of expertise. From a
purely legal stan<lpoint, however, it must be noted that Congress had
greatly simplified the task of proceeding against false ad,,ertising in
enactment of the above provisions.
The power that the agency has to enforce its orders is not nearly
so strong as that of the Post Office Department. Although it is true
-----·-·-···-··--·-·-- · · - · - - · - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .. Shaw v. Duncan, 194 F. (2d1 779
(CA-10, 1952).
"38 Stat. 717 (1914). as amended. 15

USC Secs. 41-51 n952J.
"38 Stat 717 11914). as amended. 15
uses,,,. !;2 , 1952).

"Vernon, '"Labyrinthine Ways: The
Handling of Food, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Cases by the Federal Trade Commission Since 1938," 8 Food Drug Cosmetic
Law Journal 367 (June, 1953).
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that a cease-and-desist order of the Federal Trade Commission goc.~
into effect immediately upon its becoming final, either by the pa:=.sagc
of time or by the denial of an appeal, 59 the actual effect of the order
must be noted. The order does not put the offending partly out of
business: it merely restrains him from the false advertisement of his
wares. But how small a change may be made in his a<lvertising- to take
him out from under the order and to require a new deternrn1a1111n hy
the agency that he is again im·uh-ed in false advertising-;
Although the Fe<leral Trade C()mmissiun Act. as amt·11df'd 1,y the
\,\'heeler-Lea Amendment. is aimed at suhstantially tht· ~,1me typf' .,f
,nongdoer as the post office fraud statute. there is one -.:ituation whic11
the Post Office cnul<l condemn but which FTC could not touch. That
is the case in which the oltt'n<ler is using the mail not to advertise. 11111
as an aid to his scheme- perhaps by way of distrilmt i11g his pr, ,,h1,·1
on an intrastate basis. A close examination of tht· Ft·deral T, ad1
Commission Act will shuw that this is not covered liy its pr," ,.,;.,11,
but such action is within the scupe of the Postmaster General
This is not the important difference between the t\\'11 ach h,.,, .
ever. The difference, it is submitted. is in the type of 11ffen<ler at ,, hi.-h
they are aimed. Tt is apparent from the quantum of prooi required by
each act and by their pruvisions fur remedial artion that they are
directed at two different groups. The postal statutes are directed ::it
the fraud, the swindler. the tty-by-night drug merchant who is nr,thi11g
but an outright cheat. The Federal Trade Commissir,11 has a:- i1,
primary obligation the policing 11f false--not necessarily fraudulc111
advertising. I ts efforts should he primarily direcled at tht' drug ur
deYice distributor whu. although his advertising contains some qm·,;.
tionable claims or misrepresentations. still produces a grn,d and valuable product. He should not be destroyed: he merely should hl·
chastised.
Food and Drug Administration.-Before the passage of the Fedenl
Food, Drug. and Cosmetic Act uf 1938 "0 there was a wi<lt· -.;plit betwren
those who ·wanted t() place all adYertising 1:untrol of foods. drugs and
cosmetics in the Foud and Drug Administration and those who wan1t'd
to place it in the Federal Trade Commission.'" Cong-ress. wisely or
not, failed to gi,·e any l'<mtrc,J uf advertising to FDA. 62 The Adminis:.,. 38 Stat. 717 (19141. as amended. Hi
USC Sc~. 45 (1952).
,~ 52 Stat. 1040 (1938). as amended. 21
USC Secs. 301-392 !1952 l.

"' Dunn. Wheeler-1,ea. Ar.I 0938). p 343
80 ronv-re.ssiona.l Rer.or<I 4429-4436 (lll.38)
,;, Wheeler-Lea Tr-ade Commission Act,
52 Stat. 111 '19381 15 USC Secs. 52-58
(1952).
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tration has found it possible to exert a limited control over advertising,
nevertheless, by what has been commonly called the "squeeze play."
Here the agency takes the position that a drug is misbranded
under Section 502(£) of the Act 68 in that it fails to conta.in "adequate
directions for use" if, although advertised for the cure or treatment of
a certain disease, there is no reference to the disease on the label. If
the disease is noted on the label, and it is not in fact treated by the
medication, then the drug is misbranded under Section 502(a). 64
Strong arguments can be, and have been made, 65 that it was never
the intention of Congress to give such power to FDA, but the courts
have upheld the agency whenever its legality has been tested. 66
The Federal Food and Drug Administration is undoubtedly the
best equipped, from a scientific standpoint, for the c.ontrol of false and
fraudulent claims in the drug and .device field. The data-gathering
forces that it has at its command, in the scientific and medical fields;
singles it out as the agency which should be the most effective in preparing and prosecuting these cases, yet these forces are not available
for use in the control of advertising. The many other duties of the
agency are paramount, and the prosecution of false advertising can
only be on a highly selective basis.
Cooperation between the postal department and the Food and
Drug Administration is extremely necessary and highly to be desired.
By the pooling of their resources, their statutory authority and their
knowledge, advances can be made which neither agency could hope to
make independently.

Conclusions
Although the founders of our Nation felt that "the power of establishing postroads [and a postal system] must, in every· view, be a
harmless power, and may, perhaps by judicious management, become
productive of great public conveniency. Nothing which tends to
facilitate the intercourse between states can be deemed unworthy of
the public care," 67 their observations are not wholly true. The power
63 52 Stat. 1050 (1938), as amended, 21
USC SeC'. 352(!) (1952).
•• Nelson. "Control of Advertising by
Section 502(f) (1). 7 FoOd Drug Cosmetic
Law Journal 579 (September. 1952).
65 Work cited at footnote 64, at p. 593.

.. Alberty Food Products Company v.
U. S., CCH Food Drug Cosmetic Law Re-

ports ff 7182, 185 F. (2d) 321 (CA-9, 1950);

Colgrove v. U. S., 176 F. (2d) 614 (CA-9.

1949), cert. den., 338 U. S. 911 (1950);
U. S.

v. 38 Dozen Bottles of Tryptacin,

CCH Food Drug Cosmetic Law Reports
ff 7264, 114 F. Supp. 461 (DC Minn .. 1953).
• 1 The Federalist, No. 42, at p. 278 (Modern Library Ed., 1941) (Madison). It Is
believed that this Is the only reference to
the establishment of a Post Office Department In The Federalist.
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to control the postal department, which includes the power to exclude
one from the use of the mails, has become one of the strongest of governmental weapons. As the postal system expanded and ber;in,c ,nore
efficient, business practices changed; the customer who used to he
around the corner or across the town moved across the countrv ;ind
could only be served as long as the free and unrestri<:-ted use of the
mails was available. As this power has grown, consumer and mer··
chant have found themselves allies in the search for a method of discouraging and punishing fraud through the use of the mails.
Such controls must contain adequate safeguards for the protection
of industry and, at the same time, must be of sufficient strength to be
effective. One of the primary sources of control has always been the
post office fraud statutes, and these statutes have a place in our law
today, even though Congress has enacted additional laws aimed at the
same end.
From the standpoint of effectiveness of these statutes. the Administrative Procedure Act was detrimental; in respect to the necessity of
providing procedural safeguards that act was both desirable and necessary. The act requires revision, however, to return it to its stature as
a weapon of the government against fraud. The amendment currently
being proposed is far from adequate for this purpose because it destroys
the safeguards which the Administrative Procedure Act brought to the
proceedings.
Even though the postal statutes are a necessary part of our protective scheme, they are of very limited applicability. They are
directed at fraud. and fraud implies and connotes intentional deception
of the public. If there be any attempt on the part of the Postmaster
General to extend the purview of the acts to include cases other than
those of genuine fraud, it is the duty of the courts to restrain sur:h
action. Ideally. though, the restraint should come from the agency
itself.
[The End]

FOOD PRODUCTS-PRICE DISCRIMINATION,
BROKERAGE COMMISSIONS
A seller of food products which grants a promotional allo,~ance
to one customer must offer affirmatively, or otherwise make available,
such allo\\'anccs to all competing customers on proportionally equal
terms. ( Released 1fay 3, 1956.)
A corporation has been ordered to stop accepting brokerage compensation from food-products manufacturers on sales made to its stockholders which arc wholesalers. (Released ,ray 3, 1956.)-CCH TRADE
REGULATION RF.PORTS
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